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WHO WANTS TO BE AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE ADVOCATE?: OPTIONS FOR 
BRINGING AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE COMPLAINT IN THE WAKE 
OF ALEXANDER V. SANDOVAL 
KYLE W. LA LONDE* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval 
significantly altered options for bringing an environmental justice 
claim. Several causes of action still remain, however, that can be an 
effective means of achieving environmental justice. This Article will 
explore these causes of action and show that each has unique charac-
teristics and can present distinct opportunities. This Article will also 
address the importance of tailoring environmen tal justice claims to 
best suit the plaintiff. Finally, this Article will present a case study of a 
proposal to build a geothermal power plant in an area of California 
that is sacred to Native Americans, and suggest an effective strategy 
for bringing an environmental justice claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 24, 2001, the Supreme Court dealt a major blow to the 
environmen tal justice movemen t.1 Its decision in Alexander v. Sandoval 
changed the landscape of the environmental justice movement, over-
turning thirty years of precedent and forcing environmental justice 
advocates to search for new mechanisms to pursue their goals. 2 The 
Court chose to sharply and drastically depart from its own jurispru-
dence and that of several courts of appeals, which had established the 
framework for bringing environmental justice claims under Title VI of 
* Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General; J.D. 
2003, The George Washington University Law School; B.A. 1999, University of California at 
Davis. The author would like to thank Shi-Ling Hsu for his encouragement and guidance 
on this project. He would also like to thank Gregory E. Maggs, Jeffrey Rosen, and Jessica 
Stockton for their advice and suggestions. The views and analysis expressed in this article 
are the author's own and do not reflect the official policy or legal position of the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency or the United States Government. Any remaining errors 
are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
2 See The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 306, 498 (2001). 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court, led by 
Justice Scalia,4 held that there is no "private right of action to enforce 
regulations promulgated" under § 602 of Title VJ.5 The Court arrived 
at this decision by using a strict textualist6 approach to interpreting 
the statute and discounting prior Supreme Court decisions as plural-
ity opinions, noting that the Court is "bound by holdings, not lan-
guage."7 This decision has greatly altered the framework under which 
environmental justice claims need to be pursued. 
This Article will trace the environmental justice movement from 
its conception to its current state, analyzing the impact of the Court's 
decision in Sandoval and suggesting the use of alternative claims to 
mitigate its effect, paying special attention to the claims of Native 
Americans. The remainder of this Article consists of four parts. Part I 
outlines the origins of the environmental justice movement, docu-
menting the range of cases it has encompassed and its conflict with 
other social movements. Part II scrutinizes the Court's decision in 
Sandoval, setting forth the Court's rationale and its treatment of 
precedent on the issue. Part III discusses the impact of the decision, 
noting its effect on the environmental justice movement. It also offers 
several alternate approaches to bringing an environmental justice 
claim, outlining the various causes of action and examining their rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses. Part IV discusses the importance of 
choosing the remedy best tailored to the particular client being repre-
sented, paying special attention to Native Americans. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
No date can be affixed to, no person can be given credit for, and 
no particular event can be cited as, the genesis of the environmental 
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)). 
4 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice 
Scalia's opinion. Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 277. 
5 Id. at 293. 
6 "Textualism is a theory of statutory interpretation holding that the meaning of a 
statute is controlled by the statute's text, rather than by policy arguments, legislative his-
tory, or most other extrinsic sources." Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textuaiis1lt and the 
Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 393 n.l (1996); see also 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for 
Congress's intent with the text and structure of Title VI. H). 
7 Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 282. 
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justice movement.s Its development has been slow, it has drawn from 
many sources, and it has faced many hurdles to become what is rec-
ognized today as one of the greatest social crusades of the modern 
era.9 While its origins cannot be adequately circumscribed, its evolu-
tion can be traced to several seminal twentieth century events. 10 
The modern era of environmental justice began to take shape in 
the 1960s, as the civil rights movement was hitting full stride. ll Some 
attribute the origin of the modern movement to the United Farm 
Workers' struggle against pesticides in the work place.12 Others point 
to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s work to improve working conditions 
for Mrican American garbage workers as the starting point.13 Sociolo-
gist Robert Bullard points to the drowning death of an eight-year-old 
8 The evolution of the label used to represent the spirit of the movement is indicative 
of the difficulty in attributing the movement to a certain person, place, or event. See 
CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN jR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 9-13 
(1998) (tracing the rhetorical shift in the language used to describe the modern incarna-
tion of the movement from "environmental equity" and "environmental racism" to "envi-
ronmental justice"). 
9 See Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Envim1l1nentalism: Finding Environmental Jus-
tice's Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,4-5 (2002) (chronicling 
the tensions between the civil rights and environmental movements and the failure to fully 
integrate the two movements). 
10 While many scholars have tied the origins of the environmental justice movement to 
the civil rights movement, which began in the 1950s along with the environmental move-
ment, those views are too restrictive. See Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environ-
mental Justice: The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental Regula-
tion, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 143-145 (2002) (calling the environmental justice 
movement "the confluence of the two great social movements of the twentieth century"); 
see also LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND Up: ENVIRONMENTAL RA-
CISM AND TIlE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 20 (2001) (noting that 
some commentators trace the roots of the struggle in North America to over 500 years ago 
when the first Europeans arrived on the continent and began displacing the Native Ameri-
cans); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968); Rennard 
Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contempormy View of the Native American Experi-
ence, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713, 733-34 (1986). 
II See Yang, supra note 9, at 6-7 (noting the disconnect between the two movements); 
see also Charles jordan & Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities, and the Mainstream Envi-
ronmental Movement, in VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FOR A 
NEW ERA 71, 75-78 (Donald Snowed., 1992) (noting that minorities could not become 
members of the Sierra Club's California chapters until the 1950s). 
12 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 10, at 19-20. 
13 UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3-4 
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) (stating that King's mission to improve working conditions 
for striking African American garbage workers before he was shot in 1968 was really one of 
environmental justice) [hereinafter UNEQUAL PROTECTION J. 
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African American girl in a neighborhood garbage dump in 1967.14 To 
others, the first lawsuit alleging environmental discrimination, filed in 
1979, was the beginning.I5 
It was not until 1982, however, in Warren County, North Carolina 
that the environmental justice movement became cohesive with a clear 
objective: that minority communities should not be disproportionately 
burdened by environmental harms.I6 In Warren County, an African 
American community led by the Rev. Benjamin ChavisI7 protested the 
siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill in its neighbor-
hood. IS The Warren County protests led to a study by the United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO), which confirmed that racial mi-
norities were disproportionately burdened by harmful environmental 
risks. I9 Four years later, the United Church of Christ, led by the Rev. 
Benjamin Chavis, conducted its own study, but expanded the scope be-
yond the southern United States, to which the GAO study had confined 
14 Id. at 3. The drowning set off a campus riot at Southern University, a predominantly 
Mrican American college in Houston, Texas. Id. Students were protesting the siting of the 
dump in the middle of the nearby Mrican American neighborhood. Id. 
15 See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp.673, 675-76 (S.D. Tex. 
1979), afi'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs alleged that locating a garbage 
dump in their mostly Mrican American community violated § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871. Id. The court ultimately denied the plaintiff's claim as it found there was no inten-
tional discrimination shown. Id. at 681. Previously, however, a similar attempt to stop a 
waste facility from being located in the area was successful when the area was comprised of 
mostly white residents. UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 13, at 4. 
16 SeeJulia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsttits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can 
a Legal Tool Build EnvironmentaIJustice1, 27 B.C. ENvn. An. L. REV. 631, 634-36 (2000); see 
also Dale Russakoff, As in the 60s, Protestors Rally; but This Time the Foe Is PCB, WASIL POST, 
Oct. 11, 1982, at AI. 
17 Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, 25 ENVTL L. 285, 289 (1995) (noting that Chavis has been credited with coining the 
phrase "environmental racism"). 
18 See NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5 (EoD.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982). The protests and 
accompanying lawsuit brought by the NAACP ultimately proved unsuccessful because the 
court noted that there was not "one shred of evidence" that race was a motivating factor in 
the siting of the landfill. Richard J. Lazarus, P1miuing "Environmental Justice:" The Dist1ilnt-
tional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 832 (1993) (citing Gorsuch, 
No. 82-768-CIV-5, at 9-10 n.8). 
19 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, VOL. No. 48, UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEYS BULLETIN 1 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_ 
room/usab4801.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUND-
ING COMMUNITIES (1983). The study was requested by Walter Fauntroy, the District of Co-
lumbia's delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, who was arrested for his participa-
tion in the Warren County Protests. See Fisher, supra note 17, at 296-97. 
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itself.20 This study again found that race, more than any other factor, 
played a prominent role in the siting of hazardous waste facilities. 21 In 
1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the En-
vironmental Equity Workgroup.22 The Workgroup's 1992 report 
confirmed the earlier studies and went on to state that the disparity 
could not be attributed to income alone.23 
While the movement began by protesting hazardous sitings, it did 
not limit itself to these complaints. The movement soon began to at-
tack the disproportionate enforcement of environmental laws. A 1992 
study by the National Law Journal found that government enforcement 
of Superfund sites had been stricter in areas where the populations 
were predominantly white. 24 In response to these accusations, the 
Clinton Administration issued an Executive Order which directed 
federal agencies to consider environmental justice implications when 
making decisions. 25 EPA also took steps to remedy the problem by es-
tablishing the Office of Environmental Justice, a federal advisory 
committee, and by promulgating a formal administrative complaint 
process for bringing disparate-impact claims under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 It is with this momentum that the environ-
mental justice movement braced for the results of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval. 
20 Sec COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND 
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987); EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 19, at 1. 
21 COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 20, at xiii-xiv. 
22 Latham Worsham, supra note 16, at 635. 
23 See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRON-
MENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 6-15 (1992), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/reducingJisk_com_vol1.pdf; 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, at 
http://www.epa.gov/oswer/ejlaboutej.htm (last visited Nov. I, 2003). But sce Douglas A. 
Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Enviromncntal Equity " Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 
EVALUATION REv. 123, 129-33 (1994) (finding no correlation between hazardous waste siting 
and race); Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A Critique of 
Envi1TJnmentaljusticc Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 121, 121-22 (1997) (question-
ing environmental justice advocates and their claims of a relationship between race and the 
siting of environmentally undesirable land uses). 
24 Sce Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, A Special Investigation, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2 (noting that penalties 
at sites with the greatest concentration of whites were 500% higher than at sites with the 
greatest concentration of minorities). 
25 Exec. Order No. 12,898,59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
26 Sce Y.'lng, supra note 9, at 7. 
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II. THE CASE: ALEXANDER V. SANDOVAL 
Sandoval was a class action lawsuit brought to enjoin the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety's decision to administer driver's license 
examinations in English only.27 Plaintiff Sandoval brought suit in the 
district court, alleging that the English-only policy violated Depart-
ment of Justice (DO]) regulations, promulgated under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 which prohibit using federal funds in a way 
that effectively discriminates on the basis of race or national origin.29 
Title VI, rooted in Congress's spending clause power, prohibits dis-
crimination by institutions that choose to utilize federal funds. 3o Title 
VI contains two sections relevant to this Article. Section 601 sets forth 
the Title's direct anti-discrimination provision. It states, "[n]o person in 
the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."31 Section 602 authorizes "[e]ach Federal 
department and agency" that "extend[s] Federal financial assistance" to 
"effectuate the provisions of section 2000d [§ 601]" through "issuing 
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability" that will help 
achieve the objectives of the statute.32 Section 602 authorizes federal 
agencies to enforce the regulations they adopt pursuant to the Act's 
guidelines.33 No private right of enforcement is explicitly stated.34 Pur-
suant to § 602, DO] promulgated regulations stating that a "recipient 
... may not ... utilize criteria or methods of administration which have 
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their 
race, color, or national origin. "35 It is under this DO] regulation that 
Sandoval brought her claim in the litigation.36 
The majority, per Justice Scalia, began its opinion by stating that 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the narrow issue of 
''whether there is a private cause of action to enforce the [DO]] regula-
27 Alexanderv. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278-79 (2001). 
28 See id. at 278-79. 
29 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-1(2000); Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 278-79. 
30 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (stating Title VI 
was enacted under Congress's power to spend for the general welfare of the United States). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
32 [d. § 2000d-1. 
33 [d. 
34 [d.; see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89. 
35 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2) (2003). For a similar Department of Transportation regula-
tion see 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b) (2) (2003). 
36 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79. 
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tion."37 Justice Scalia then immediately sought to discount the Court's 
prior decisions on the issue by emphasizing that "[a]lthough Title VI 
has often come to this Court, it is fair to say (indeed, perhaps an under-
statement) that our opinions have not eliminated all uncertainty re-
garding its commands. "38 He next analyzed whether a private right of 
action existed under § 602 and posited that if such a right did exist, it 
"must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602" as "courts 
may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy 
matter." 39 Justice Scalia further stated that "private rights of action to 
enforce federal law must be created by Congress. "40 In order to deter-
mine whether Congress created a private right of action, the intent of 
Congress must be deciphered.41 To uncover this intent, Justice Scalia 
asserted that the Court need delve into the context of the Act's passage 
only when it is needed to clarifY the text. 42 He then held that the text of 
the statute was dispositive, alleviating the need to look at the context of 
the Act's passage.43 Finally, he concluded that Congress intended no 
private right of action to exist under § 602.44 
Justice Stevens dissented,45 contending that the majority miscon-
strued the Court's previous decisions by holding that DOJ regulations 
37 [d. at 279. 
38 See id.; see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (pro-
viding for injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of Title VI regulations by state 
officials); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (allowing private right of ac-
tion under Title IX); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974) (allowing private right of 
action to enforce rights guaranteed by Title VI). 
39 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87. The dissent points out that "the majority offers little 
affirmative support for its conclusion." [d. at 315 (Stevens,j., dissenting). In support of his 
decision,justice Scalia cited a puzzling previous concurrence he wrote, in which no mem-
ber of the Court joined. [d. at 287 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gil-
bertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia,]., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment». justice Scalia had stated, "Raising up causes of action where a statute has not 
created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribu-
nals." [d. (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrowv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 
(1991) (Scalia,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment». 
40 [d. at 286. justice Scalia further stated, "[1] t is most certainly incorrect to say that 
language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not been author-
ized by Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer him-
self." [d. at 291. 
41 [d. at 286-87 ("Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, 
we will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink."). 
42 [d. at 288. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 288-89 (indicating that if Congress had intended a private right of action it 
would have specified so in detail as it did in § 601). 
45 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 (Steyens, j., dissenting). justice Stevens was joined by jus-
tices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
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do not establish a private right of action under Title VI.46 He also 
pointed out that an alternative means of relief may still be available: 
"[l]itigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations 
against state actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to ob-
tain relief."47 Justice Stevens also criticized the Court's strict textnalist 
approach to interpreting the statute.48 As the dissent artfully illus-
trated, the decision in Sandoval was a sharp and shocking departure 
from thirty years of precedent established under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which had allowed a private right of action under 
§ 602.49 
III. ALTERNATE METHODS FOR LITIGATING 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLAIMS 
While the decision in Alexander v. Sandoval closed the door to private 
individuals seeking to bring environmental justice claims under § 602 of 
Title VI, it was not the death knell of the environmental justice move-
ment. Like the civil rights movement before it, activists and proponents 
of the environmental justice movement will have to overcome this set-
back, take new routes, and remain persistent in order to achieve their 
ultimate goal of environmental equality. 50 Several other viable channels 
can still be used to address claims of discrimination in the environ men tal 
context.51 These channels include civil rights laws, constitutional chal-
lenges, common law tort claims, federal and state environmen tal laws, 
46 [d. at 294 (Stevens. J .. dissenting) ("[T]his Court has repeatedly and consistently 
affirmed the right of private individuals to bring civil suits to enforce rights guaranteed 
under Title VI."); see also id. at 295 n.1 (Stevens,].. dissenting) ("Just about every Court of 
Appeals has either explicitly or implicitly held that a private right of action exists to en-
force all of the regulations issued pursuant to Title VI, including the disparate-impact 
regulations. ") . 
47 [d. at 300 (Stevens,]., dissenting). Justice Stevens based this proposition on the 
Court's prior holdings. See id. at 299-300 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (citing Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 635-45 (1983». 
48 See id. at 304 (Stevens,]., dissenting) ("The majority'S statutory analysis does vio-
lence to both the text and the structure of Title VI."). 
49 See id. at 294-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading 
Cases, supra note 2, at 498. 
50 See Plessy V. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (allowing separate but equal ac-
commodations for whites and blacks); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,415 (1856) 
("[Members of] the Mrican race ... were not citizens ... of the United States, and were 
not therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in other States.") (citing 
Crandall V. State. 10 Conn. 339 (1839». 
51 One environmental justice scholar, Luke Cole, placed § 602 third on his four-tier hi-
erarchy for bringing environmental justice claims. See Luke W. Cole, Envi'rou1lIentai Justice 
Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling. 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 523. 526 (1994). 
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legislative remedies, and claims unique to particular minority groups. 
This section will explore these possible legal strategies, discussing their 
strengths and weaknesses and evaluating their ultimate utility. 
A. Section 601 of Title VI 
When the Supreme Court ruled that disparate-impact claims could 
no longer be brought under § 602 of Title VI, it did not altogether pre-
clude environmental justice claims from being brought under Title 
VI.52 Title VI contains two sections that prohibit discrimination in fed-
erally funded programs. 53 While prior to Sandoval, § 602 and its dispa-
rate-impact regulations provided an attractive option to private plain-
tiffs, the rigid construction of § 601 offers little hope.54 Section 601 of 
Title VI, unlike § 602, requires proof of discriminatory intent.55 Thus 
far this has proven to be a nearly insurmountable burden of proof. Al-
most every claim brought to date alleging intentional discrimination 
has failed. 56 The exception is municipal services cases, where plaintiffs 
have alleged that cities or towns were providing municipal services in a 
discriminatory manner.57 Unfortunately, these cases have little applica-
52 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (commonly referred to as § 601 and prohibiting inten-
tional discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (2000) (known as § 602 allowing agencies to 
promulgate regulations that effectuate the provisions of § 601). 
54 See Bradford M. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES 
AND PROCEDURES TO AnDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 23, 23-24 (Michael B. Gerrard 
ed., 1999). 
55 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 ("[Ilt is ... beyond dispute-and no party disagrees-
that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination."); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo 
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 608 n.l (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Seven members of the 
Court agree that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of discriminatory in ten t."). 
56 See Cole, supra note 51, at 538-39 (discussing the difficulty of proving intentional 
discrimination in environmental justice cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Constitution); see also R.I.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) 
(finding no dicriminatory intent in the siting of garbage dump in minority community by 
county board of supervisors); EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio V. Chern. Waste Mgmt., 
No. CV-F-91-578-0WW' (E.D. Cal. filed July 7,1991) (determining no discriminatory intent 
in siting of toxic waste incinerator); Bordeaux Action Comm'n v. Metro. Nashville, No. 
390-0214 (M.D. Tenn. filed Mar. 12, 1990) (failing to find discriminatory intent in opera-
tion of garbage dump in minority community). 
57 See Cole, sttpra note 51, at 537-38; see, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 
1290,1292 (5th Cir. 1971), afl'd en bane, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding a denial of 
equal protection where ninety-seven percent of homes not served by sanitary sewers were 
in black neighborhoods); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1370-76, 1379 
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (finding discrimination against black neighborhoods with respect to pro-
vision of water facilities, street paving, as well as park and recreational facilities). 
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bility to environmental justice claims. 58 Therefore, using § 601 alone to 
challenge siting decisions is not a viable course of action. 
B. Section 602: Compelling Agencies to Enforce Their Own Regulations 
While there is no longer a private right of action to enforce 
agency regulations promulgated under § 602, a plaintiff may still seek 
redress by filing an administrative complaint with an agency, asking it 
to enforce its regulations.59 The regulations promulgated by EPA60 
provide the best means for bringing a legal challenge on environ-
mental justice grounds, as the permits issued by EPA will most likely 
be the source of many environmental justice claims.6t This Article will 
limit itselfto a discussion of EPA's § 602 regulations.62 
One key advantage to using § 602 regulations to bring an envi-
ronmental justice complaint is that these regulations cover a broad 
scope of activities. To bring a Title VI complaint, a plaintiff need only 
demonstrate that there is a federal funding nexus.63 Therefore, any 
program or activity receiving federal funding is implicated.64 Since 
EPA provides some form of funding to nearly every state environ-
mental agency, the permits these agencies issue, as well as those issued 
by EPA, are all potentially subject to Title VI jurisdiction.65 
58 See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 130-36 (2d ed. & Supp. 1984) 
(indicating that the small-town nature of these cases would distinguish them from most 
environmental justice claims); see also Lisa S. Core, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval: Why a 
Supreme Court Case About Driver's Licenses Matters to Environmental Justice Advocates, 30 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 191, 195 (2002). 
59 See 42 U .S.C. § 2000rl-1 (2000). For a list of agencies that have promulgated such 
regulations under § 602, see Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority UlIdeTTepTesentatioll in 
Publicly Funded Constmction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE LJ. 
1577,1581 n.25 (1992). 
60 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2002) (prohibiting use of discriminatory criteria in federal 
programs); id. § 7.35(c) (prohibiting the siting of a facility in an area where it will have a 
discriminatory effect). 
61 See Mank, supra note 54, at 24. 
62 EPA's regulations, like those of all other federal agencies, are modeled after the De-
partment of Justice's regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.107 (2002). 
63 42 U .S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
64 See id. 
65 See Mank, supra note 54, at 23. Of particular import are the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the legislation that 
created the Superfund, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). See 
Lazarus, supra note 18, at 835 n.215. Under these acts most states receive federal funds to 
clean up hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6931, 6947-6949, 9604, 9611 (2000); Lazarus, 
supra note 18, at 835 n.215. 
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Another advantage to § 602 complaints is that proof of inten-
tional discrimination is unnecessary.66 Unlike § 601 's direct prohibi-
tion of intentional discrimination, § 602 authorizes federal agencies 
to promulgate rules which would effectuate the goals of § 601.67 This 
has been interpreted as allowing these regulations to prohibit actions 
that would have indefensible disparate impacts, and to allow funds to 
be withheld from programs that discriminate.68 This substantially low-
ers the burden of proof. Instead of proving a discriminatory intent, 
the plaintiff need only prove that the action has a discriminatory ef-
fect or disparate impact.69 
EPA first promulgated regulations under § 602 in 1973 and re-
vised them in 1984.70 These regulations prohibit recipients of federal 
funds from "us[ing] criteria or methods of administering its program 
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination be-
cause of their race, color, [or] national origin."71 They further pro-
hibit recipients of funds from choosing a site or locating a facility 
where it would have a discriminatory effect.72 Despite this, EPA did 
nothing to enforce these rules until the mid-1990s.73 In February 
1998, EPA published an Interim Guidance "to provide a framework 
under which it should process complaints filed under Title VI that 
allege discriminatory effects arising from the issuance of environ-
mental permits."74 In 2000, EPA again issued guidance to "provide a 
framework for ... [EPA] to process complaints filed under Title VI 
... alleging discriminatory effects resulting from the issuance of pol-
lution control permits.".75 Recently, high ranking officials within EPA 
66 See Mank, supra note 54, at 23. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000). 
68 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1985) (detailing the nature of dis-
crimination prohibited by Title VI) (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Ser. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 
582, 584, 607-08 (1983». 
69 See Latham Worsham, supra note 16, at 646. 
70 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7, 12 (2001); see also Yang, supra note 10, at 164. 
71 See 49 Fed. Reg. 1661 (jan. 12, 1984) (codified at40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2002». 
72 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c). 
73 See Latham Worsham, supra note 16, at 646 (noting that EPA viewed its primary goal 
as regulating pollution and feared that pursuing environmental justice claims would limit 
its ability to pursue this goal). 
74 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI AD-
MINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998). This guidance was issued in 
response to an Executive Order issued by President Clinton which instructed federal agen-
cies to be more conscience about environmental justice. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
75 See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environ-
mental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for 
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have indicated that they intend to make environmental justice a prior-
ity.76 Despite the guidance and recent statements, the progress of ad-
ministrative complaints lodged with EPA remains exceedingly slow.77 
To date, EPA has only rendered a substantive decision in one case.7S 
There are several drawbacks to seeking administrative enforce-
ment of § 602 regulations. First, there is no public right of participa-
tion incorporated into the process.79 Second, there is no time limit for 
which EPA must render a decision, allowing the process to drag on for 
several years.so Third, the only substantive remedy EPA may impose is 
termination of a grantee's funding. s1 This extreme remedy will likely 
make EPA reluctant to impose it, unless the discrimination is severe 
and there are few positive benefits from the program.S2 Fourth, there 
is no provision to provide damages to the plaintiff. s3 Lastly, the plain-
tiff has no right to appeal the agency's decision,s4 while there is a 
right for the defendant to appeal.85 Given all of these drawbacks, 
filing an administrative complaint with EPA regarding Title VI may be 
an exercise in futility. 
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Inves-
tigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,667-70 (June 27, 2000). 
76 In 2001, EPA Administrator Whitman recommitted the Agency to "a firm committ-
ment to the issue of environmental justice and its integration into all programs, policies, 
and activities, consistent with existing environmental laws .... " CHRISTINE TODD WHIT-
MAN, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA's COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1 
(2001), available at http://www.epa.gov / compliance/ resources/ policies/ ej/ admin_eL 
commiCletter_081401.pdf. EPA's top enforcement official, John Peter Suarez, said the 
agency is looking at ways to incorporate environmental justice more in to its case selection 
process and he is making clearing the backlog of environmental justice complaints a prior-
ity. Environmental Justice, Supplemental Projects Among Priorities at EPA Compliance Office, 11 
Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) B-34-B-35 (Jan. 16, 2003). 
77 See Yang, supra note 10, at 168-69. 
78 See St. Francis Prayer Ctr. v. Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, EPA File No. 5R-98-R5, 
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/ssdec_ir.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003); Letter from 
Anne E. Goode, Director, EPA, to Father Phil Schmitter and Sister Joanne Chiaverini, St. 
Francis Prayer Center 6 (Oct. 30,1998) (on file with author) (finding no violation of Title 
VI). 
79 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 706 n.41 (1979). 
80 Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice, and the EPA: A Brief History of :1dmin-
istrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 309, 
321-22 (1994). 
81 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (2002). 
82 Mank, supra note 54, at 28-29. 
83 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130. 
84 Fisher, supra note 17, at 317 n.158 (citing Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 
906 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
85 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b) (3) (outlining appeals process for recipients of federal funds 
upon an EPA determination of noncompliance with § 602). 
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Currently, individuals are not entitled to bring an action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)86 to compel federal agencies to 
enforce their Title VI regulations, leaving little recourse for challenging 
EPA's lethargy with Title VI complaints.87 Courts have reasoned that 
APA suits are unnecessary because plaintiffs have the option of directly 
challenging, in court, the recipients of funds who are violating Title 
VJ.88 But, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Sandoval, the ra-
tionale for such decisions no longer exists, opening up the possibility 
that courts may begin to allow challenges under the APA.89 
Despite this possibility under the APA, there are also pragmatic 
considerations that make filing a suit under § 602 regulations unat-
tractive. While the validity of regulations proscribing disparate im-
pacts was not before the Court in Sandoval, the majority, per Justice 
Scalia, sought to address the topic.90 Justice Scalia initially stated that 
the Court would "assume for purposes of this decision that § 602 con-
fers the authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations. ''91 He 
then proceeded in a footnote to attack the validity of this assumption 
despite several cases holding the contrary.92 He noted, "We cannot 
help observing, however, how strange it is to say that disparate-impact 
regulations are 'inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably inter-
86 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) , 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). 
87 See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 191-92 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
88 See id. No court to date has ruled that the APA is a viable option. See id. ("[W]e think 
that Cannon's direct remedy against funding recipients is not only 'adequate,' but, as the 
Supreme Court recognized, is preferable to a direct suit against the agency itself."); 
Women's Equity Action League, 906 F.2d at 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding APA is a 
default remedy when statutory remedy is not adequate); Scherer v. United States, 241 F. 
Supp. 2d 1270, 1288 (D. Kan. 2002) (indicating that APA suits are only available when 
there is "no other adequate remedy in court"). 
89 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
90 Id. at 285-86 n.6. 
91 Id. at 286. 
92 Id. at 286 n.6. The Supreme Court in plurality opinions and dicta has indicated that 
disparate-impact regulations are authorized under § 602. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 
287,293-94 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1983) 
(White, ].). Several circuit courts have held that disparate-impact regulations are author-
ized by § 602. See, e.g., Powell V. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1999); N.Y Urban 
League, Inc. V. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); Latinos Unidos v. Sec'y of 
Hous. & Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); see also Thomas A. Lambert, The Case 
Against Private Disparate Impact Suits, 34 GA. L. REV. 1155, 1163 (2000). In his dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens admonishes Justice Scalia for his failure to provide adequate weight to the 
Court's prior, fractured Title VI opinions. See Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 295 (Stevens,]., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens states: "the failure of our cases to state this conclusion explicitly does 
not absolve the Court of the responsibility to canvass our prior opinions for guidance." Id. 
(Ste\·ens,]., dissenting) 
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twined with' § 601 ... when § 601 permits the very behavior that the 
regulations forbid. "93 Justice Scalia artfully discredited the Court's 
previous, on-point opinions as plurality opinions or mere dicta, while 
at the same time citing his own concurrences and dissents in the very 
same opinions as authority for the proposition he was espousing.94 
This brief reference to the validity of disparate-impact regulations 
is demonstrative of the majority's antipathy toward such regulations. 
While the Court was constrained from directly confronting the issue, 
as it was not raised in the courts below, the majority did provide a 
strong indication of how it would rule if given the opportunity.95 
Given this, use of disparate-impact regulations to enforce environ-
mental justice claims is not the most prudent course ofaction.96 
C. Other Constitutional and Civil Rights Causes of Action 
The primary constitutional cause of action available for bringing 
environmental justice claims is the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.97 The Amendment expressly provides that no state 
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."98 In environmental justice claims, this has been interpreted as 
requiring proof that persons similarly situated are being treated differ-
ently and there is intent to effectuate this discrimination.99 As in claims 
asserted under § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment will be nearly impossible to sustain. lOO 
93 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 n.6 (quoting Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion at page 
307). 
94 See id. at 279-82 (Scalia,]., concurring in the judgment) ("[W]e have abandoned 
the expansive rights-creating approach exemplified by Cannon . .. and perhaps ought to 
abandon the notion of implied causes of action entirely." (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992»; id. at 286-87 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment»; id. at 292-93 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 
U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia,]., dissenting»). 
95 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82; Respondents' Bdefat 9-10, Sandoval (No. 99-1908). 
96 For a thorough analysis of this aspect of the case, see John Arthur Laufer, Note, Al-
exander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1613 (2002). 
97 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
98 See id. 
99 See Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(finding no discriminatory intent in the siting of an industrial plant in a largely African 
American community). 
100 See supra Part liLA. 
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The immediate aftermath of the AlexandeT v. Sandoval decision 
provided hope for advocates that the private right to bring disparate-
impact claims that the Court had just eliminated under § 602 still ex-
isted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.101 In his dissent in the Sandoval case, 
Justice Stevens stated, "Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the 
Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only ref-
erence § 1983 to obtain relief .... "102 Academic commentators and 
courts quickly latched onto Justice Stevens's assertion, and the first 
environmental justice claims brought under § 1983 were successful.103 
However, the tide would soon turn with the same swiftness and de-
cisiveness that swept away the private right to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations under § 602. In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed a district court holding that allowed disparate-impact 
claims to be brought under § 1983.104 The court ruled, "ifthere is to be 
a private enforceable right under Title VI to be free from disparate-
impact discrimination, Congress, and not an administrative agency or a 
court, must create this right. "105 The court grounded its opinion in the 
fact that the "implications of [the] case are enormous" and therefore it 
should be Congress and not the court that makes such a pivotal deci-
sion.106 The court distinguished prior cases allowing such claims by 
emphasizing that those cases had focused on carrying out congres-
sional intent, and § 1983 should only be used as a vehicle to carry out 
Congress's intent when its intent is plain. 107 Since there was no clear 
intent in § 602 to allow a private right of action to enforce disparate-
101 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 299-300 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissen ting). 
102 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 300. 
103 See Bradford C. Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 
49 U. RAN. L. REV. 321 (2001); see also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(indicating that disparate-impact claims may still be brought under § 1983); Langlois v. 
Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52-55 (D. Mass. 2002) (allowing a disparate-
impact suit pursuant to § 1983); White v. Engler, 188 F. Supp. 2d 730, 744-45 (E.D. Mich. 
2001) (permitting suit under § 1983 in the context of dispersal of education funds); S. 
Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.2d 505, 517 (D.NJ. 
2001), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Crr. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 939 (2002) (holding Sandoval 
did not foreclose bringing a § 602 claim under § 1983). 
104 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d 
Cir.2001). 
I05Id. at 790. 
106Id. 
107 Sec id. 
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impact claims, "particularly in light of Sandoval," there was no logical 
reason to allow such claims under § 1983.108 
Soon after the South Camden decision the Supreme Court sounded 
the death knell to bringing disparate-impact claims under § 1983.109 In 
Gonzaga University v. Doe the Court held that since the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974110 created no privately enforceable 
rights, it could not be enforced under § 1983.111 The Court began its 
decision by establishing that its "implied right of action cases should 
guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable 
under § 1983. "112 The Court then restated its finding in Sandoval that 
there was no evidence of intent by Congress to create an implied right 
of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations under Title VI.ll3 
When read together, these two statements indicate that the Court 
would also not allow § 1983 to be used to enforce Title VI disparate-
impact regulations. 
D. Common Law Actions 
Before the environmental regulatory framework was established 
by Congress in the 1970s, the common law of torts was the only rem-
edy available to plaintiffs who sought to rectify environmental 
harm.114 The use of the common law in environmental cases is well 
established and can be traced back as far as 1842 in the United 
States. ll5 The main common law tort claims that can be used in an 
environmental context are public and private nuisance, trespass, and 
strict liability}16 These causes of action place liability upon actors who 
disturb protected property interests, cause physical injury or property 
damage, and substantially interfere with the possession or the use and 
enjoyment of one's property. 
108Id. at 790-91. 
109 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286-87 (2002). 
110 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000». 
1\1 See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 286-87. 
112 Id. at 283. 
mId. at 283-84. 
114 See SUSAN J. BUCK, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION AND LAW 2-
4 (1996) (tracing the origins of common law from England to its first use in America to 
remedy environmental harm). 
115 See Martin v. Wadell, 41 U.S. (16 PeL) 367,416 (1842) (analyzing the public trust 
doctrine); BUCK, supra note 114, at 3. 
116 For a thorough analysis of environmental torts see GERALD W. BOSTON & M. 
STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 21-139 (1994). 
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The most frequently used common law tort in environmentalliti-
gation is nuisance.1I7 This is not mere happenstance; nuisance is used 
so frequently because it can be applied to a broad range of cases and 
can be used without demonstrating a direct physical invasion. lIS In a 
private nuisance, the plaintiff must prove there has been a "nontres-
passory invasion of [his] interest in the private use and enjoyment of 
[his] land" which has resulted in substantial harm. 1I9 
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, 
his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest 
in the private use and enjoyment ofland, and the invasion is ei-
ther (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional 
and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability 
for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous 
conditions or activities.120 
To bring an action under the public nuisance doctrine, the plain-
tiff must prove there has been "an unreasonable in terference with a 
right common to the general public. "121 In determining the unreason-
ableness of the interference one must consider "whether the conduct 
involves a significant interference with the public health, the public 
safety, the public peace, the public comfort[,]or the public conven-
ience. "122 Other considerations are "whether the nuisance is proscribed 
by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation" or is "of a continu-
ing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect" and the 
"actor knows or has reason to know" that the action has a "significant 
effect upon the public right."123 In order to recover in a public nui-
sance claim, the plain tiff must have suffered a "harm of a kind differen t 
from that suffered by other members of the public"124 or "have author-
117 STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 16 (2d ed. 
2001). 
liS See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY 8 (1996) (stating that the law of nuisance applies to "excessive noise, 
noxious odors, [and] smoke or dust settling on a landowner's property"). 
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). 
120Id. § 822. 
121 Id. § 82IB(l). 
122Id. § 821B(2) (a). 
123Id. § 82IB(2) (b)-(c). 
124 Id. § 821C(1); see also Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. 
Mass. 1986) (holding that a personal injury to one's health rather than to property satisfies 
this requirement). For a detailed discussion of the special injury rule, see Denise E. Anto-
lini, Modemizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Pamdox of the SPecial Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 755 (2001). 
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ity as a public official or public agency to represent the state or a politi-
cal subdivision in the matter," or otherwise "have standing to sue as a 
representative of the general public. "125 
A plaintiff may seek both damages and equitable relief, including 
an injunction, in nuisance actions.l 26 These actions are particularly 
viable in environmental justice siting cases when a hazardous waste 
plant is sited in a minority neighborhood, as the products of the plant 
are likely to unreasonably interfere with the residents' use and en-
joyment oftheir land and cause substantial harm to them.127 
Nevertheless, minority communities are presented with numer-
ous barriers to sustaining both private and public nuisance causes of 
action.l 28 In a private nuisance case, a court may balance the harm the 
plaintiffs are suffering against the social utility of the action creating 
the harm.l 29 In one celebrated case, a court denied the plaintiff's re-
quest for an injunction and allowed the defendant to pay permanent 
damages in lieu of the injunction, as the social utility of the plant was 
deemed to outweigh the damage it was causing.l3o Such a result in an 
environmental justice suit is nothing but a defeat, as the sole purpose 
of the claim is to abate the harm the actor is causing to the commu-
nity. In public nuisance cases it is difficult to demonstrate harm dis-
tinct from other persons in the area, thereby causing the courts to 
deny standing.l31 Also, like the proof of intentional discrimination, 
proof that the conduct is intentional or unreasonable can be unat-
tainable, especially when the facility is operating under a valid per-
mit. 132 Causation can also be difficult to prove because information on 
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C. 
126 BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 118, at 8. 
127 See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 
1979) (holding that although plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial threat of rrl'epal'able 
injmy, they were not likely to show disCl'iminatOl'Y intent under § 1983), afi'd mem., 782 
F.2d 1038 (5th Crr. 1986). 
128 See Latham WOI'sham, supra note 16, at 640. 
129 See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 118, at 8. 
130 Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873-75 (N.Y 1970) (reasoning that the 
costs of shutting down the defendant's plant would be dispmponionately large compared 
with the harm it was causing); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 951 cmt. a 
(1979) (allowing damages to be awarded in place of an injunction if to do otherwise would 
rrnpose undue hardship on the defendant). 
131 See State ex rei. Vandervon v. Grant, 286 P. 63 (Wash. 1930) (holding that respon-
dent could not maintain public nuisance action because the harm he suffered fmm the 
obstruction of a public street and sidewalk could not be distinguished fmm its effect on 
the public generally). 
132 See supra Part III.A; see also James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: 
A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429, 453-54 (1971). 
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toxins and their effects is constantly evolving.133 Nuisance claims also 
may be prohibited by relevant federal and state statutes. 134 Lastly, be-
cause these nuisance claims focus on harm to the individual, they run 
contrary to the environmental justice movement's focus on harm to 
the minority community.135 
A closely related doctrine to nuisance that is also applicable in 
environmen tal justice claims is the tort of trespass. 136 Trespass actions 
can be used to seek an injunction or damages when a toxic release has 
interfered with an owner's possessory interest in real property.137 
Trespass is distinguished from nuisance by the requirement that there 
be a direct physical invasion of the land rather than a mere interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of the land.138 While trespass is often 
a viable claim in environmental justice cases, it does have its limita-
tions. First, there are causation problems. The party asserting the 
trespass claim must be able to prove the harm he is suffering is a re-
sult of the trespass on his property; as with nuisance claims, this can 
be nearly impossible to prove.139 Second, trespass only applies to 
property owners. Since many residents in minority communities do 
not own their property, they would not be eligible for damages. 140 
A strict liability action can be used when a defendant has engaged 
in an abnormally dangerous activity and has subjected the plaintiff to a 
risk of harm as a result. In determining whether an activity is abnor-
mally dangerous courts consider several factors.141 Given the subjective 
133 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1226-33 
(1987). 
134 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n. 453 U.S. I, 21-
22 (1981) (holding Clean Water Act preempted common law claim); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 
926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (11th Crr. 1991) (holding Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act prohibited common law remedy); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd., 952 P.2d 
610,614 (Wash. 1998) (prohibiting a nuisance claim because of state "Right-to-Farm" stat-
ute). 
135 See Fisher, supra note 17, at 310. 
136 FERREY, supra note 117, at 21. 
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1979); see also Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192 (6th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976, 
1007 (D. Kan. 1984), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988). 
138 See FERREY, supra note 117, at 21. 
139 See Farber, supra note 133, at 1226-33. 
140 See Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental 
Racislll, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485, 545 (1997). 
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979). Some of the factors are: (a) pres-
ence of a high degree of risk of harm; (b) likelihood the harm will be great; (c) inability to 
terminate risk through the exercise of reasonable care; (d) whether the activity is common 
usage; (e) appropriateness of the activity in relation to the location; and (f) social utility of 
the activity. [d.; see also State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 159-60 
46 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:27 
nature of each claim, the likelihood of success in a strict liability action 
is uncertain.142 Additionally, a strict liability claim will only allow recov-
ery for damages. Therefore, a strict liability claim cannot be brought to 
prevent a harmful siting, and damage may be inflicted upon a commu-
nity before the harm can be redressed. 
E. Environmental Laws 
Many of the aforementioned legal actions have been used byen-
vironmentalists to fill in the gaps where the elaborate environmental 
statutory framework fails to provide a remedy}43 While the existing 
environmental statutes do provide EPA with authority to address envi-
ronmental justice concerns,144 the discretion given to EPA and the 
bevy of factors it must consider often subordinate environmental jus-
tice considerations.145 Traditional environmental statutes, such as the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, do not explicitly set forth the 
statutory framework for bringing an environmental justice claim; in-
stead, environmental justice is but one of many considerations to be 
weighed during the permitting process. l46 Therefore, unlike tradi-
tional environmental claims where advocates are forced to turn away 
(NJ. 1993) (finding disposal of waste to be an abnormally dangerous activity). But see 
Avemco Ins. Co. v. Rooto Corp., 967 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying these fac-
tors, but holding storage of waste not abnormally dangerous). 
142 See Robert H. Cutting, One Man s Ceiling Is Another Man's Floor: Property Rights as the 
New Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819, 828-29 (2001). 
143 See FERREY, supra note 117, at 15. 
144 See Barry E. Hill & Nicholas Targ, The Link Between Pmtecting Natural Resources and the 
Issue of Environmental justice, 28 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. I, 8-9 (2000); see also Exec. Order 
No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994) (requiring EPA to consider environmental 
justice when making decisions); Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environ-
mental Justice into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617 (1999) (outlining EPA 
authority to implement environmental justice); Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General 
Counsel, Office of General Counsel, EPA, to Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, 
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance; Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Adminis-
trator, Office of Air and Radiation; Timothy Fields, Jr., Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Solid Waste and Emergency Response; J. Charles Fox, Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Water (Dec. I, 2000) (on file with author) (describing EPA statutory and regulatory 
authority to address environ men tal justice). 
145 See Hill & Targ, supra note 144, at 7-10; see also Yang, supra note 9, at 14-15 (noting 
that because environmental standards are constructed to achieve the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people, they often fail to take into account the unique circumstances 
of minorities). 
146 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(C) (requiring EPA to con-
sider sensitive populations in the establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards). 
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from the statutory framework when their claims are not explicitly pro-
vided for, environmental justice advocates may turn to these statutes 
and argue that inadequate weight was given to environmental justice 
concerns when the permits were issued.147 
In fact, one environmental scholar, Luke Cole, has even stated that 
efficient use of existing environmental statutes may be the best means 
for bringing an environmental justice claim.14B He believes that it may 
be the easiest way to block a facility from being sited in a minority 
community.149 This is based on the fact that judges are more familiar 
and comfortable with environmental laws, and the clarity of these laws 
makes them more likely to rule in favor of credible plaintiffs. 150 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the act most 
amenable to bringing an environmental justice claim.151 NEPA requires 
federal agencies to consider environmen tal factors before they make 
major federal decisions that will significantly impact the human envi-
ronment.152 The permits issued by EPA under federal environmental 
statutes fall under this requirement.153 If a decision reaches the NEPA 
threshold, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be pre-
pared.154 An EIS is a lengthy, public, analytical document that outlines 
the environmental effects of an action before the action is under-
taken.155 The EIS, like NEPA as a whole, imposes no substantive re-
quirements on agency decisionmaking, but rather imposes only proce-
dural requirements. 156 vVhile NEPA does not allow environmental 
justice advocates to stop a project because of harmful environmental 
\47 One must also consider the availability of claims based on state environmental stat-
utes. See Chuck D. Barlow, State Environmental Justice Prowams and Related Auth01ities, in THE 
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO AnDRESS DISPROPOR-
TIONATE RISKS 140 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999). 
148 See Cole, supra note 51, at 526 (noting an environmental justice litigation hierar-
chy); see also Lazarus, supra note 18, at 827-28. 
\49 Cole, supra note 51, at 526. 
150 See id. 
151 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U .S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (2000). 
152 [d. § 4332(c); see also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 
766,771-72 (1983). 
153 For a more complete discussion of which statutes require compliance with NEPA, see 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
CONCERNS INTO EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 5-7 (1998), available at http://www. 
epa.gov / compliance/ resources/ policies/ ej/ ej...guidance_nepa_ epa0498. pdf. 
154 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)-(c) (2002). 
155 See OLGA L. MOYA, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER'S GUIDE 56 (1997); 
Gordon R. Alphonso et aI., Fire, Wood, and Water: T7"ends in Forest Management Requirements, 
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 18,19 (2003). 
156 See FERREY, supra note 117, at 68. 
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impacts, it does allow them to delay the project and force agencies to 
think through their permit decisions entirely.157 By forcing an agency to 
strictly comply with the requirements of NEPA, an environmental jus-
tice advocate can drive up the cost and time required for the issuance 
of a siting permit for both the agency and the recipient, perhaps caus-
ing the recipient to choose an alternate site to avoid future problems. 
The Council on Environmental Quality158 has issued a guidance 
for using NEPA to implement environmental justice.l59 The guidance 
states that "[e]ach federal agency should analyze the environmental 
effects, including human health, economic, and social effects of fed-
eral actions, including effects on minority populations, low-income 
populations, and Indian tribes, when such analysis is required by 
NEPA."160 The guidance enunciates six principles by which environ-
mental justice issues should be identified and addressed.l61 
While NEPA can be an effective tool in dissuading the potential 
siting of a harmful environmental hazard, it cannot totally prevent the 
siting, as it is merely a procedural statute,l62 As a result, a delay in the 
siting and an increase in public awareness may be the only victories 
for a plain tiff. 163 Yet, it is the culmination of several small victories that 
often results in an ultimate success. NEPA provides an excellent op-
157 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) 
(holding that NEPA is merely a procedural statute, and does not demand particular results). 
158 The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was set up to outline NEPA compli-
ance guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2) (5) (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (outlining CEQ 
regulations); The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal Land and Resources: A Legal itllalysis, 
23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 67, 130 (2003). The CEQ was granted authority to issue 
binding orders through an executive order by President Carter in 1977. Exec. Order No. 
11,991,42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24,1977). 
159 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 15-16 (1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ 
nepa/regs/ ej/justice.pdf [hereinafter CEQ GUIDANCE]. 
160 Id. at 4 (citing Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12,898, 
30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279, 280 (Feb. 11, 1994)). 
161 Id. at 8-9. These principles are: (1) consideration of the racial composition of the 
area affected by the proposed action, and whether there may be a disproportionate impact 
on minority populations; (2) consideration of relevant public health and industry data and 
the potential for exposure to environmental hazards; (3) recognition of "the interrelated 
cultural, social, occupational, historical, or economic factors that may amplify the natural 
and physical environmental effects of the proposed agency action"; (4) development of 
"effective public participation strategies"; (5) assurance of "meaningful community repre-
sentation in the process"; and (6) assurance of "tribal representation in the process in a 
manner that is consistent with the government-to-government relationship between the 
United States and tribal governments, the federal government's trust responsibility to fed-
erally-recognized tribes, and any treaty rights." Id. 
162 See Karlen, 444 U.S. at 227. 
163 See Fisher, supra note 17, at 308-09. 
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portunity to draw attention to the environmental justice movement. It 
drives up the costs for siting environmentally hazardous facilities in 
minority neighborhoods and thereby eliminates the benefit of siting 
them there. I~ also forces government agencies to become more envi-
ronmentally conscious and accountable for their decisions. Lastly, it 
can help create the broad public support for the environmental jus-
tice movement that has thus far been lacking.164 
F. The Kitchen Sink Approach 
While the abovementioned legal actions provide several singular 
options for bringing an environmental justice claim, the best approach 
for bringing an environmental justice claim is to use all of the options 
available to achieve the best result for the minority community. While 
each claim has its relative strengths and limitations, when taken as a 
whole, the claims provide a solid basis for challenging a hazardous 
waste siting. When bringing an environmen tal justice suit, one must 
remember why the suit is being brought: not to gain a victory in the 
courtroom, but instead to prevent a minority population from being 
harmed by a hazardous siting. With this in mind, goals outside of the 
legal realm must be considered, such as making projects more costly 
for defendants, raising community morale, garnering attention for the 
cause, and forcing politicians to deal with the problem.165 A civil rights 
or constitutional action brings media attention to the problem and 
forces a political response, a NEPA claim causes costs to rise and delays 
the proposed siting, and a common law claim addresses the unfairness 
and disregard for the well-being of the community most affected. 166 All 
of these actions are meritorious and aid environmental justice advo-
164 For an example of how a NEPA suit can draw together a broad section of the Ameri-
can population, see Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 316 F.3d 1002, 1008-09, 1032 
(9th Cir. 2003), which sustained a challenge by a coalition of environmental, labor, and pub-
lic interest groups to the Department of Transportation's decision to open the U.S.-Mexico 
border to cross border commercial traffic without the performance of an EIS. 
165 See Cole, supra note 51, at 541. For an example of a political resolution to a prob-
lem similar to that raised by the Sandoval decision, see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989), which held that the plaintiff has the burden of production rather 
than the higher burden of persuasion in Title VII cases. In 1991, Congress reversed the 
Court's interpretation by amending Title VII to place the higher burden back on the de-
fendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2000); see also Gregory E. Maggs, Translating 
Federalism: A Textualist Reaction, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1198, 1203-04 (1998) (discussing 
the option of amending the Constitution when changes are really deemed necessary, and 
how this option is often overlooked by parties after they receive an adverse ruling from the 
Supreme Court). 
166 See supra Part UI.A-E. 
50 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:27 
cates in achieving their ultimate goal of preventing hazardous sitings 
from harming minority communities. It is irrelevant whether this is 
done through a legal decision or through increasing costs and creating 
such pressure that the siting is changed to another location. 
IV. THE NATIVE AMERICAN PARADOX 
A. SPecial Circumstances of Native Americans 
The multitude of legal actions available for asserting an environ-
mental justice claim are quite broad and amenable to most circum-
stances affecting minority communities. Nevertheless, claims cannot be 
used equally in all circumstances; instead, advocates must carefully 
choose the claims that are best suited to their particular factual setting. 
The distinctive status of Native Americans requires a different tailoring 
and selection of options than one would do for the typical plaintiff in 
an environmental justice SUit. 167 This special tailoring and selection is 
required because Native Americans' connection to the environment in 
which they live is frequently much stronger than the connection felt by 
the average plaintiff, and certain claims may be used for their cases that 
would normally be too difficult to sustain when representing other 
groups. Native Americans have deep economic, cultural, and religious 
ties to their land, as it is often the same land their ancestors inhabited 
hundreds of years ago.168 Therefore, weight must be given to more than 
just the mere physical harm that a hazardous siting will cause to the 
Native community; the cultural and religious consequences must also 
be taken into account. 169 Additionally, many Native Americans live on 
land that is exclusively their own; it is their sovereign territory170 from 
which they manage their affairs with little or no interference from the 
outside world.l71 Of equal importance, but outside the scope of this 
Article, is that in addition to asserting the aforementioned claims,172 
167 See Dean B. Suagee, Turtle's War Party: An Indian Allegory on Environmental Justice, 9 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 464-69 (1994) (providing an analysis of the environmental justice 
concerns of Native Americans). 
168 See id. at 472,496-97. 
169 See id. at 496-97. 
170 See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
17l See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1982); see also United 
Statesv. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
172 See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act to 
''Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377 (1991) (analyzing the role of 
NEPAon Native lands). 
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they may also use a number of statutes and treaties that have been en-
acted over the years to protect their interestsP3 
B. Medicine Lake Highlands Case Study 
The case of a proposed geothermal power plant in California, set 
to harness energy from lands considered sacred to Native Americans 
living in the region, provides an enlightening illustration of the need to 
tailor legal arguments in an environmental justice complaint to the 
needs of the affected community.174 The battle for drilling rights to the 
geothermal energy in the Medicine Lake Highlands of Californial75 
dates back to the 1980s when several companies purchased leases of 
Native land held in trust by the federal government and the power po-
tential of the region was discovered. 176 In 1996, the Pit River Tribe 
passed a resolution opposing the geothermal exploration in the Medi-
cine Lake Highlands.177 In 1999, the Bureau of Land Management is-
sued an Environmental Impact Statement approving drilling, with miti-
gation measures, on the Medicine Lake land, despite acknowledging 
significant impacts on traditional Native cultural and religious valuesP8 
In 2000, the Bureau of Land Management reversed its decision and put 
a halt to the drilling.179 California Energy General Corporation, the 
predecessor to the current owner, Calpine, responded to this decision 
173 SeeJudith V. Royster, Native American Law, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: 
THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO AnDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 157 (Michael B. Ger-
rard ed., 1999). 
174 See Indian Tlibes Fighting Proposal for Power Plant Suit: Project Would Ruin Lake's SPili-
tltal Power, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 18, 2002, at 19, available at 2002 WL 24309075. 
175 Medicine Lake Highlands refers to the entire region, including the Telephone Flat 
and Four Mile Hill developments. The Highlands region sits in the Modoc National Forest 
in northern California, on the edge of the largest shield volcano in the United States. See 
Eric Bailey, Electrical v. Spiritual: Indian Tribes Hope to Block Construction of a Geothennal Plant 
They Fear Will Dmil1 Healing Force of Medicine Lake, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at Bl; Suzan 
Shown Harjo, Indian Country Today, Oneida, N.Y, Guest Column, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, 
Dec. 16,2002,2002 WL 104725126. 
176 See Ken Hoover, Opposition to 2 Geothermal Proposals; Foes Say Siskiyou County Power 
Plants Would Harm Land, Defile Tlibal Sites, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 1999, at A20. 
177 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT REPORT PREPARED FOR THE PROPOSED TELEPHONE FLAT GEOTHERMAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT 3.6.2.4 (1999) (Resolution No. 96-08-25 of the Pit River Tribe), available at http:// 
www.ca.blm.gov/alturas/telephone/index.html. 
178 See id. at tbI.ES.6. 
179 See Proposed Geothermal Developments at Medicine Lake Highlands, available at http:/ / 
www.ca.blm.gov/news/2000/05/nr/decision_background.html(last visited Sept. 18, 2003); 
see also 64 Fed. Reg. 27,782, 27,783 (May 21, 1999) (noting EPA's skepticism of the Bureau of 
Land Management's Environmental Impact Statement). 
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by filing a $100 million Fifth Amendment takings claim against the 
government. lSO The complaint was dropped on December 20, 2002, 
when the Bush Administration capitulated to Calpine's demands and 
allowed drilling to resume on the Medicine Lake lands. 18l This decision 
by the Bush Administration not only broke a commitment to not build 
a power plant on the land, but also contradicted a recommendation by 
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, which recommended 
that the region be preserved in its current state. 182 In reply to the Bush 
Administration's decision to exploit the land, the Pit River Tribe, along 
with a coalition of Native and environmental organizations, filed suit to 
stop further development in the Medicine Lake region. l83 
The Medicine Lake region has long had special significance to 
the Native populations living in close proximity. 1M The Native inhabi-
tants of the region consider the land to be a spiritual sanctuary, be-
lieving that the Earth's Creator descended from nearby Mount Shasta, 
bathed in the lake after creating the Earth, imparted his spirit into 
the waters, and gave it healing powers. l85 Tribal medicine men still use 
the site to conduct coming-of-age ceremonies, while others use it to 
cleanse their body and soul. l86 It is a region in which tribal members 
have been attempting to fight off incursions for over 150 years. 187 
Tribal members are already forced to wait until nightfall to use the 
sacred waters because of recreational sightseers. l88 The proposed Cal-
pine geothermal plant will further disrupt the use of this sacred water 
and, in the view of many who use it, destroy its spiritual significance.189 
lao Cal. Energy Gen. Corp. v. United States, No. 0O-CV-619 (Fed. CI. filed Oct. 17, 2000). 
181 Id.; see also Dean E. Murphy, U.S. Approves Power Plant in Area Indians Hold Sacred, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A32. This article quoted an Agriculture Department spokes-
man: "the Justice Department said we are going to lose boatloads of taxpayer money if we 
don't find a way to give these guys a fairer hearing." Murphy supra, at A32. It also stated 
that the Calpine suit had heavily influenced the decision. Id. 
182 See Murphy, supra note 181, at A32; see also BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DE-
CISION: TELEPHONE FLAT GEOTHERMAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ON FEDERAL LEASES CA 
12370, CA 12371, CA 12372, CA 13803, CA 21933, and CA 25008 (2002). 
183 Pit River Tribe v. Dep't of Interior, No. 02-CV-1314 (E.D. Cal. filed June 17, 2002) 
(not yet briefed). 
184 Murphy, supra note 181, at A32. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. 
187 Bailey, supra note 175, at B1 (detailing the history of the land from settler incur-
sions during the 1850s gold rush to current power exploration). 
188 Murphy, supra note 181, at A32. 
189 See Eric Bailey, Geothemtal Plant Near Tlibal Site Approved: Reversal of Clinton-era Agree-
ment Angers Native Amelicans Who Call the California Lake Sacred, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at 
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For these reasons, opposition to the Calpine plant has garnered wide-
spread support from Native American organizations.190 
In an effort to overcome the extensive opposition to the project, 
Calpine has lobbied extensively to gain support for its geothermal 
plant. 191 Calpine has been able to successfully drive wedges between 
tribes and tribal members in the region through extensive payoffs. 192 
It has taken notice of the meager financial means of the Native com-
munity and exploited that fact in an effort to gain the support of 
tribal members who value economic stability more than their spiritual 
heritage. 193 Calpine has even paid local tribal members to represent it 
in Congress in an effort to gain support for future projects.194 
The Medicine Lake case demonstrates that the existing environ-
mental justice framework does not always fully comprehend the conse-
quences that certain sitings have on the community being harmed.195 
While the indigenous people of the region face potential environ-
mental harm from the geothermal plant, they also risk losing their cul-
tural identity.196 This dynamic is often overlooked in the traditional en-
vironmental justice model, where the focus is on factors such as 
AI; see also Bailey, supra note 175, at BI (quoting Jerald Jackson, a tribal elder, as equating 
the situation to "a Catholic going to confession and someone opening the door"). 
190 See International Indian Treaty Counsel Resolution No. 2002-10, adopted Sept. 21, 
2002, at http://www.treatycouncil.org/new_page_57111112I.htm (supporting Pit River 
Tribe's opposition to geothermal plant development and urging federal agencies to halt 
the project); The National Congress of American Indians Resolution No. JUN-00-021,June 
25-28. 2000, at http://www.ncai.org/data/docs/resolution/2000_midyear_session/mid-
yr00021.h tm. 
191 See Scott Winokur & Christian Berthelsen, Calpine's Quest for Power: Amel;ean Indians 
Split over Bay Area Supplier's Eff01·ts to Tap What Some Fiero as Their Own SaUTee of SaCl"Cd, Spiri-
tual EneTgy, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2001, at AI. 
192 See id. 
193Id. (discussing a supposed payoff of $25,000 to the Shasta Nation to assist them in 
their quest for federal tribal recognition, over $500,000 spent in lobbying, and several 
scholarship awards). 
194 Id. One of these paid consultants, Rosemary Nelson, has been quoted as saying, "I 
wonder how relevant these historic and spiritual sites are to your life ... when Indians have 
the highest unemployment, alcoholism and suicide rates? Preserving cultural sites is im-
portant, but it hasn't solved the problems of Native Americans. We honor our ancestors by 
living successfully in the presen t." Id. Other tribal members have been quoted as saying, 
"[ tl hat healing power and all that is baloney; that went out in the 1900s." Bailey, supra note 
175, at Bl (statement of Pit River Tribe member Erin Forrest, Calpine supporter). 
195 See Erik K. y',mamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 311, 354 (2001) (discussing a similar situation faced by native Hawaiians). 
196 See supra notes 184-190 and accompanying text; see also Hill & Targ, supra note 144, 
at 31 (explaining how the impact ofa change in local ecology can have a significant effect 
on native populations). 
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statutory interpretation, causation, and in ten t. 197 Despite these 
difficulties, a cause of action still must be selected in an effort to miti-
gate as much harm as possible. 
C. Selecting the Best Cause of Action 
While the lawyers for the native inhabitants of the Medicine Lake 
region have not yet briefed their complaint and fully articulated their 
causes of action, they must be careful in their selection, as not all of 
the aforementioned causes of action can be sustained in court.198 Title 
VI offers little hope of relief for the Medicine Lake plaintiffs. As dis-
cussed above, § 601 and its requisite proof of intentional discrimina-
tion is not a viable option in this case because there is no evidence of 
intentional discrimination.199 In order to prove intentional discrimi-
nation they would have to establish that the primary motivation of 
Calpine in building the plant was to harm the native inhabitants of 
the region, and that the decision was not precipitated by another valid 
reason.200 Given that there is a geothermal source of energy in the 
region, providing Calpine with a nondiscriminatory reason for locat-
ing the plant there, it will be difficult for plaintiffs to prove inten-
tional discrimination.201 
Also, given the Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval, a 
§ 602 disparate-impact complaint is also not an effective option.202 In 
Sandoval, the Court ruled that disparate-impact claims will no longer 
be entertained by the courts.203 Therefore, the only option the plain-
tiffs have for a Title VI claim is to file an administrative complaint with 
EPA.204 The attorneys for the plaintiffs chose to use this option and 
quickly filed a § 602 complaint with EPA.205 The complaint was filed in 
January of 2002; however, to date, no action has been taken by EPA.206 
The complaint was almost immediately placed on suspended status by 
EPA, as the attorneys for the plaintiffs had also filed a complaint in 
197 See supra Part III. 
198 See supra Part III. 
199 See supm Part III.A. 
200 See 42 V.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
201 See Sit pra Part III. 
202 See supra Part II. 
203 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 V.S. 275, 288 (2001). 
204 See supra Part III.B. 
205 See V.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGt:NCY, TITLE VI COMPLAINTS FILt:D WITH EPA AS OF FEB-
RUARY 28, 2003 4 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/docs/t6csfeb2003. 
pdf. 
206Id. 
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district court.207 It is EPA policy to take no affirmative steps to investi-
gate a Title VI complaint if there is a concurrent action filed in dis-
trict court concerning matters related to the Title VI complaint.208 
Given the track record of EPA in administering Title VI complaints, 
the plaintiffs were left with the option of either filing a complaint with 
EPA and waiting, hoping they will resolve it in a more expedited 
manner than they have with similar complaints in the past, or file an 
action in district court.209 In this case, the attorneys chose to file a 
claim in district court, essentially foreclosing Title VI as a colorable 
option, given EPA's refusal to deal with Title VI complaints while con-
current actions are open in district court. Additionally, reliance on 
the finality of an EPA administrative action could be a risky proposi-
tion in light of the strong language against the very existence of Title 
VI regulation in Sandoval.210 If EPA were to rule in the plaintiff's favor, 
the decision could be reversed on appeal if the validity of the regula-
tions themselves and the administrative process are challenged. 
The lawyers should also resist relying on a complaint alleging a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.21l An equal protection claim, like the § 601 claim, would be 
nearly impossible to maintain given the required proof of intentional 
discrimination.212 Absent a confession by a Calpine official, this bur-
den of proof will not be met, as there is no proof of intentional dis-
crimination from the facts available. From the current evidence, it 
seems clear that this location was chosen because of the geothermal 
energy source, and not because of a desire to harm the members of 
the Medicine Lake community. 
A disparate-impact claim brought under § 1983 will also likely be 
impossible to maintain. While Justice Stevens provided hope that such 
a claim could be maintained in his Sandoval dissent, the Supreme 
Court has subsequently foreclosed § 1983 as an option in its decision 
in Gonzaga University v. Doe.213 Therefore, bringing a § 1983 claim 
would have no benefit, other than to give the court an opportunity to 
207 [d.; see also Pit River Tribe v. Dep't of Interior, No. 02-CV-1314 (E.D. Cal. filed June 
17,2002) (not yet briefed). 
208 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.07, 50.3 (2003). 
209 See supra Part III.B. 
210 See supra Part III.B. 
211 See supra Part III.C. 
212 See supm Part III.C. 
213 Sec supra Part III.C. 
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clarify that § 1983 IS not a viable vehicle for bringing an environ-
mental claim. 
The traditional common law complaints of nuisance offer a 
greater chance for victory. Nuisance claims can be tailored to address 
the harm that the Medicine Lake plaintiffs are suffering.214 While the 
overall harm to the environment in the Medicine Lake case will not 
be as significant as the harm suffered in other notable environmental 
justice cases because the plant will be small in scale and geothermal 
plants are generally cleaner running than coal fired power plants, the 
plaintiffs will still suffer significant harm. They will suffer harm of a 
spiritual rather than environmental nature215 and a nuisance action 
may be used to address this harm.216 The precise harm suffered will 
be the loss of the sacred water and its concomitant healing power. 
Nevertheless, a private nuisance claim will likely fail because the 
courts may balance the harm the plaintiffs are suffering-loss of the 
water's spiritual powers-against the benefits of the proposed plant, a 
source of clean energy for a state in desperate need of more power.217 
California, the site of the plant, is emerging from recent power short-
ages that caused substantial damage to the state's economy as a result 
of forced business closings and rolling blackouts.218 When the state's 
need for power is weighed against the spiritual loss to a small percent-
age of its population, a court will likely tip the scales in favor of the 
greater public interest, the power plant.219 
A public nuisance claim is the more attractive option. As described 
above, in a public nuisance claim the plaintiff must prove that there has 
been "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the gen-
eral public. "220 A plaintiff also needs to demonstrate that the harm is 
"of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting 
effect" and the "actor knows or has reason to know" that the action has 
a "significant effect upon the public right. "221 Lastly, the plaintiff must 
have suffered a "harm of a kind different from that suffered by other 
214 See supra Part III.D. 
215 See supra notes 174-194 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra Part III.D. 
217 See Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-75 (N.V. 1970) (holding that 
the costs of shutting down the defendant's plant would be disproportionate to the harm it 
was causing). 
218 See Carl Hulse, Energy Matters Return to Fore on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, 
at Cl. 
219 See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872-75. 
220 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) m TORTS § 821 (B) (1) (1979). 
221 [d. § 82IB(2) (c). 
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members of the public."222 In this case, the disturbance of the spiritual 
powers of the lake will be the unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the public.223 The plaintiff will also be able to demonstrate 
that the interference is unreasonable since the defendant, Calpine, has 
been apprised of the cultural significance of the region and has still 
chosen to proceed with the plant.224 Since the land has been granted to 
the tribe and its members by the federal government, the requisite pos-
sessory interest in the land has been met as well.225 The plant will also 
produce a permanent and long lasting effect on the region because the 
spiritual value of the water will be destroyed, with no possibility of re-
generating in the future. 226 
Typically, the most difficult aspect of the public nuisance action is 
demonstrating that the plaintiff is suffering harm different from that 
being suffered by others similarly situated.227 In this case, Calpine may 
have inadvertently enabled the defendant to meet this element. In its 
effort to gain approval for the plant, Calpine lobbied members of the 
tribe to gain their support.228 It achieved its goal, and even got some 
tribal members to declare that there are no longer any spiritual pow-
ers in the lake.229 Given these statements by some tribal members, a 
plaintiff alleging that there are still spiritual powers in the water will 
be a plaintiff who is suffering a harm of a kind different than that suf-
fered by the other members of the region, those who believe there are 
no spiritual powers. Therefore, a public nuisance claim may be a vi-
able option for stopping the construction of the Calpine plant. 
Trespass and strict liability causes of action would not be appro-
priate for this fact pattern.230 The plant will not cause a direct physical 
invasion of the plaintiff's land; instead the plant will interfere with the 
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of their land, making nuisance the ap-
propriate cause of action rather than trespass. A strict liability claim 
222 Id. § 821C(I); see also Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. 
Mass. 1986) (holding that a personal injury to one's health rather than to property satisfies 
this requirement). For a detailed discussion of the special injury rule, see Denise E. Anto-
lini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Pamdox oj the SPecial Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 755 (2001). 
223 See Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1233; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(I); 
Antolini, supm note 222; supm notes 174-194 and accompanying text. 
224 See supm Part III.D. 
225 See supm Part IILD. 
226 See supm Part IILD. 
227 See supm Part IILD. 
228 Supra Part IV. 
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will also not work because the geothermal plant will not be an ab-
normally dangerous activity.231 
A National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) complaint may also 
be appropriate because it not only fully takes into account the appar-
ent harms, but also takes into account the cumulative and collective 
impacts of the proposed action.232 NEPA, more than any of the other 
causes of action, takes into account the cultural and social impacts an 
action will have on the community being affected.233 The Council on 
Environmental Quality guidelines require that "interrelated cultural, 
social ... and historical" factors be considered when evaluating the 
environmental effects.234 Therefore, the spiritual impacts must be 
considered along with the environmental impacts. The strong impacts 
on the Native Americans living in the Medicine Lake region make 
NEPA another strong option, as the proposed geothermal plant is cer-
tainly a major action that will significantly affect the environment.235 
The permits required to begin operating the plan t make it a federal 
action and the more than de minimis size of the plant makes it a ma-
jor federal action. The end result of the plant will have a significant 
impact on the human environment. 236 Additionally, the procedural 
delays caused by the filing of a NEPA complaint may also effect Cal-
pine's decision to proceed with the project,237 
The best approach to the Medicine Lake case is to use several 
causes of action.238 As discussed above, a common law nuisance claim 
and a NEPA action are the most appropriate claims for this factual 
setting. Of course, lawyers could still use the other causes of action to 
their advantage, despite their low chance of success in the courtroom. 
A Title VI or Equal Protection complaint could be used to draw public 
attention to the proposed plant and its harmful effects. An allegation 
of intentional discrimination will often bring with it attention from 
the media. This public attention and accompanying political pressure 
can bring about a less traditional solution, such as a political resolu-
231 See supm note 141. 
232 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 877-78 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that not only 
should cumulative effects be considered, but also indirect effects that may come later but 
are reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2002). 
233 See supm Part IILE. 
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tion of the matter.239 While Sandoval foreclosed one vehicle for bring-
ing an environmental justice claim, it did not end the environmental 
justice movement, as the Medicine Lake example demonstrates.24o 
D. Results of Similar Cases 
In cases analogous to the Medicine Lake predicamen t, courts 
have responded with varying degrees of sensitivity. In a 2000 case in-
volving water rights, the Hawaii Supreme Court chose to take into ac-
count the distinctive characteristics of the indigenous plaintiffs when 
it rendered its decision.241 In reaching its holding, the court took into 
account traditional Hawaiian culture and rights, and reconceptual-
ized the public trust doctrine in order to preserve the customs of the 
indigenous plaintiffs.242 
In stark contrast to the Hawaii court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit 
took a more conservative approach to a claim brought by the Apache 
Tribe of Arizona.243 In that case, the Apache were attempting to halt 
further construction of an observatory on land that the Apache con-
sider sacred ground.244 The court dismissed the case, holding that 
their claim was moot because the harm they sought to prevent had 
already occurred and "no effective relief for the alleged NHPA [Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act] violation" could be granted.245 A 
significant portion of the project had already been completed, power 
lines and structures had already been erected, and little was left to be 
done to bring the project to conclusion.246 While the court acknowl-
edged that completion of a project does not necessarily make a case 
moot, they held that in this particular instance no relief could be 
granted because it would be impractical to remove the harm.247 The 
court did not address whether the construction could be halted and 
the structures already built could be torn down to restore the land to 
239 See Greg Lucas, Tribes Wager Newfound Clout on Sacred Land: Bill Gives Power to leto 
Project Proposed near Spiritual Ground, S.F. CHRON., July 29, 2002, at Al (documenting an 
effort by tribal leaders to gain a legislative veto to projects on native lands). 
240 See supra Part II. 
241 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 449 (Haw. 2000). 
242 Id. at 439-50; Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 195, at 352-59. 
243 See Mount Graham Coalition v. McGee, 52 Fed. Appx. 354, 355 (9th Cir. 2002). 
244 See National Trust Legal Defense Fund, WF Update, (Octobe)' 2001), available at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/legal_advocacy / docs/ review 1 O-OI.pdf. 
245 Mount Graha1/! Coalition, 52 Fed. Appx. at 355. 
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its prior state.248 While the Hawaii court demonstrated that courts can 
balance cultural significance to a particular group against the needs 
of society as a whole, the Ninth Circuit demonstrated that courts will 
not always accord much weight to culture when balancing interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval has greatly 
altered the framework for bringing an environmental justice claim. Its 
impact on the movement has been more of a forced reorganization 
than a shutting down. Several causes of action still remain that can be 
effectively used to achieve environmental justice. When choosing which 
cause of action to assert, careful attention must be paid to ensure that 
the needs of plaintiffs, and the special circumstances that surround 
their cases, are adequately accounted for. As this Article has pointed 
out, each case has unique characteristics, and with those unique char-
acteristics come distinctive opportunities. It is these opportunities that 
an environmental justice advocate must seize upon. 
248 See id. at 354-55. 
